We study how discount window policy affects the frequency of banking crises, the level of investment, and the scope for indeterminacy of equilibrium. Previous work has shown that providing costless liquidity through a discount window has mixed effects in terms of these criteria: it prevents episodes of high liquidity demand from causing crises, but can also lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium and to inefficiently low levels of investment. We show that offering discount-window loans at an above-market interest rate can be unambiguously beneficial. Such a policy generates a unique stationary equilibrium. Banking crises occur with positive probability in this equilibrium and the level of investment is suboptimal, but a proper combination of discount-window and monetary policies can make the welfare effects of these distortions arbitrarily small. We also show that when the specification of the investment technology allows money to serve as an equilibrium store of value, a costless-liquidity policy can eliminate crises without generating indeterminacy.
Introduction
A fundamental characteristic of banks is that their assets and liabilities have different maturity structures. A bank's liabilities are largely short-term deposits, while a substantial part of its assets are typically held in long-term, less liquid investments. This maturity transformation activity produces substantial social benefits, but it also exposes banks to the possibility of a liquidity shortage.
Indeed, the history of the U.S. banking system is full of crises in which a shortage of liquidity led to a distortion in the allocation of resources that was considered to have been largely avoidable. 2 These episodes have led to the belief that the smooth and proper functioning of the banking system requires the supply of currency to be elastic, that is, to change in response to short-term fluctuations in the demand for liquidity. One way of providing an elastic currency is through discount window lending; the central bank can offer short-term loans of currency to banks that are illiquid but otherwise in sound financial condition. The availability of discount window loans and the terms governing these loans have important macroeconomic effects, both in periods of crisis and in "normal" times. Once a crisis is underway, for example, the ability of banks to borrow at the discount window will in large part determine its severity. During non-crisis times, the terms at which credit will be available if a crisis occurs influence the amount of liquidity that each bank chooses to hold in its portfolio. This choice, in turn, determines (i) the likelihood that the entire banking system will run out of liquidity and slide into a crisis, and (ii) the quantity of resources placed into (illiquid) investment and hence the future wealth of the economy. Finally, some discount window policies have been shown, in a certain class of models, to be potentially destabilizing in the sense that they lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium allocations. We analyze, using a fully-specified general equilibrium model, the effects of discount window policy on macroeconomic stability and welfare. In particular, we focus on how the interest rate charged on discount window loans affects the frequency and severity of liquidity-induced banking crises, the quantity of real investment, and the scope for indeterminacy of equilibrium allocations.
A number of previous papers have shown, within a general equilibrium framework, how offering discount window loans at a zero nominal interest rate can facilitate the smooth functioning of the banking system and thereby lead to better equilibrium allocations. In Sargent and Wallace [15] , for example, the demand for credit fluctuates deterministically and there is a legal restriction on the issue of private credit instruments. In this environment, having a discount window that offers loans at a zero nominal interest rate leads to the existence of a Pareto optimal equilibrium, while closing the discount window does not. In the Pareto optimal equilibrium, currency yields the same return as illiquid assets, and hence discount window loans are being offered at the market rate of interest and acquiring liquidity is costless. The benefits of providing discount window loans at a zero nominal interest rate have since been established in a variety of environments; examples are Freeman [9] , which focuses on the role of liquidity in the payments system, and Williamson [19] , which examines a model with moral hazard. 3 In each of these papers, having a discount window provide costless liquidity improves equilibrium allocations by eliminating or minimizing the impact of liquidity shortages. In this sense, offering discount window loans at a zero nominal interest rate has been shown to contribute to the stability of the banking system. However, a recent paper by Smith [17] points to a potential danger of following such a policy: it can lead to a "massive" indeterminacy of equilibrium. 4 In this way, discount window lending can be a source of macroeconomic instability.
We move away from the focus on a zero nominal interest rate and allow the central bank to charge a positive interest rate on discount window loans. This move implies that liquidity need not be costless to obtain in equilibrium, and that the interest rate on discount window loans may be above the market rate of interest. Interestingly, this is precisely the type of policy adopted by the Federal Reserve System in January 2003. Previously, discount window loans were typically granted at below-market rates, with stringent requirements employed to limit access to this credit.
Under the new Primary Credit Program, however, banks in good standing can borrow freely from the discount window at slightly above-market rates. Our interest is in evaluating the performance of such policies in terms of preventing banking crises, encouraging real investment, and avoiding indeterminacy of equilibrium. The environment we study is the same as that in Smith [17] , which builds on the work of Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] . There is an infinite sequence of twoperiod lived, overlapping generations of agents. A linear investment technology can be used to transform one unit of young-period consumption into a greater amount of old-period consumption.
3 A later paper, Freeman [10] , studies an environment with aggregate financial shocks and compares zero-nominalrate discount window lending with other ways of providing an elastic currency. See also Schreft and Smith [16] , which shows how discount window lending can be superior to open market operations as a policy tool, and Haslag and Martin [12] , which emphasizes how discount window lending can encourage banks to undertake productive investment instead of holding "excess" reserves.
This investment can be liquidated early, but only at a loss. There is also a stock of fiat currency, which the central bank can change over time through lump-sum injections/withdrawals. Each agent is assigned to one of two physically-separated locations at birth, and in each period a fraction of young agents is randomly selected and forced to move to the other location. This fraction is itself a random variable in each period. Limited communication prevents the cross-location exchange of privately-issued liabilities, and therefore relocated agents must carry with them either currency or liquidated investment. Banks arise in this environment to insure consumers against the possibility of relocation. These banks take deposits, divide their portfolio between currency and investment, and provide payments to depositors that are contingent on their relocation status.
When there is no discount window, a fundamental tension arises between the stability of the banking system and the efficiency of equilibrium allocations. If monetary policy generates a positive nominal interest rate, banks perceive an opportunity cost of holding cash reserves and therefore economize on such holdings. As a result, the banking system is relatively illiquid, and there are recurrent "crises" in which bank reserves are exhausted and agents in need of liquidity suffer losses in consumption. 5 These crises can be avoided entirely if monetary policy instead conforms to the Friedman rule and generates a zero nominal interest rate, because there is then no opportunity cost of holding cash and banks therefore hold sufficient reserves to meet any possible level of liquidity demand. Notice, however, that in this case banks are no longer performing their maturitytransformation function. As a result, socially-productive investments are not undertaken and the equilibrium allocation is far from optimal. This seems like precisely the type of environment where discount window lending would be a useful policy tool. If, after observing the fraction of agents to be relocated, banks could obtain loans of currency ("discounting" their real investments to the central bank) they could continue to serve their intermediary function and at the same time crises caused by a shortage of liquidity might be averted. Smith [17] shows that this intuition is correct: granting banks access to discount window loans at a zero nominal interest rate eliminates liquidity-induced banking crises. However, he also shows that this policy leads to the existence of a continuum of stationary equilibria, for the following reason. When discount window loans are freely available at a zero nominal interest rate, monetary policy must set the market rate of interest to zero as well (otherwise there would be no demand for currency in the market). When both of these rates are zero, a bank is completely indifferent between holding liquid assets and making real investments. As a result, any division of banks' portfolios between currency and investment is 5 We say that a banking crisis occurs whenever depositors who are relocated receive lower real returns than other depositors. See Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] for a detailed justification of this interpretation of a banking crisis.
4 consistent with equilibrium and hence there are infinitely many (stationary) equilibria, each with a different level of real investment. Some of these equilibria generate higher welfare than closing the discount window, but others generate lower welfare. In other words, the model does not give clear guidance as to whether or not a discount window should be opened. Perhaps the best statement that can be made is that this type of discount window policy is "dangerous."
We show that, in contrast, when the nominal interest rate charged on discount window loans is positive and is higher than the market interest rate, there is a unique stationary equilibrium in which money has value. In other words, free access can be granted to discount window loans without generating indeterminacy as long as borrowing from the discount window is more expensive than holding cash reserves. In addition, charging a positive interest rate at the discount window allows monetary policy to generate a positive market interest rate and thereby encourage real investment. There are downsides to this approach, however: Banking crises will occur in equilibrium and real investment will remain below the efficient level. We ask what policies are optimal in terms of generating the highest level of steady-state welfare. We show that there exist policies that generate equilibrium allocations arbitrarily close to the first-best allocation, but that no policy actually implements the first-best allocation. The near-optimal policies entail having low (but positive) market nominal interest rates and nearly-costless liquidity at the discount window.
We then show that the non-existence of an optimal policy results from the lack of a role for money in the model other than providing liquidity to relocated agents. We do so by replacing the linear investment technology with a standard model of production, thereby bringing the model into the Diamond [6] framework and introducing diminishing returns to investment. Continuing to focus on stationary equilibria, we show that if the diminishing returns are strong enough to create a store-of-value role for money, an optimal policy does exist. This policy entails setting the market nominal interest rate to zero and providing discount window loans at this market rate. The policy does not lead to the indeterminacy discussed in Smith [17] precisely because the return on investment is endogenous; only one level of investment will lead to the interest rate required for markets to clear. Hence, in this setting, the optimal policy is a combination of the Friedman rule with a costless-liquidity regime at the discount window.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the details of the basic model and describe in detail the optimal behavior of individual banks. In Section 3 we describe the equilibria of the model under different policy regimes; we present the corresponding welfare analysis in Section 4. Section 5 contains the analysis of the model with diminishing returns to investment. Finally, in Section 6 we offer some concluding remarks.
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The Model
We begin by presenting the environment of Smith [17] , and then introduce a discount window that offers loans at a positive nominal interest rate. The majority of the section is devoted to deriving the optimal behavior of competitive banks for a given discount window policy.
The Environment
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations of agents, plus an initial old generation. In each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., a continuum of identical agents with unit mass is born in each of two locations. There is a single consumption good; each agent is endowed with w > 0 units of this good when young and none when old. Agents only care about consumption in the second period of life, and have the utility function u (c) = ln (c). 6 In the initial period there is a continuum of old agents with unit mass in each location, and each of these agents is endowed with M −1 units of fiat currency.
At the beginning of a period, young agents receive their endowment and, possibly, a transfer of currency. At this point, neither agents nor banks can move between or communicate across locations, and therefore trade can only occur within each location. Young agents can trade with old agents and can deposit resources in a bank. Banks can also trade with old agents in this market.
After trade takes place and deposits have been made, there is an opportunity to invest goods in a storage technology. This technology transforms one unit of the period t good into R > 1 units of the period t + 1 good, and it is the only form of real investment available. Goods that are neither consumed nor placed into this technology will perish once the investment opportunity has passed. The other asset available in the economy is money. In addition to potentially serving as a store of value, money facilitates transactions made difficult by spatial separation and limited communication (as in Townsend [18] ). It is straightforward to show that a young agent will choose to deposit all of her income in a bank, rather than holding assets directly. With the deposits it receives, a bank engages in trade to achieve the desired allocation of its portfolio between money and goods, and then invests the goods in the storage technology.
After the investment opportunity has passed, a fraction π t of young agents in each location dis- 6 As in Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] and others, the assumption of logarithmic utility here permits the solution to the bank's problem to be characterized analytically.
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covers that they will be moved to the other location. 7 Goods invested in the storage technology cannot be transported between locations unless the investment is first liquidated. A unit of investment that is liquidated yields a return of r < 1. Limited communication prevents privately-issued liabilities, such as checks, from being verifiable in the other location. Currency, on the other hand, is universally recognizable and non-counterfeitable, and is therefore accepted in both locations.
Movers are able to contact their bank and withdraw resources in the form of currency and/or liquidated investment. Immediately afterwards, movers are relocated and the next period begins. In this new period, movers use the currency they received from the bank to buy consumption in their new location, and non-movers contact their bank and withdraw any remaining currency together with the proceeds of matured investment. At this point all old agents consume and end their lifecycle.
The relocation probability π t is a random variable in each period. Since there is a continuum of young agents, it represents both the probability of relocation for each agent and the fraction of all agents who move. That is, π t gives the size of the aggregate liquidity shock in period t; higher values of π t correspond to higher demand for liquid assets. It is independently and identically distributed over time, with support [0, 1], and is drawn from the smooth, strictly increasing distribution function G with associated density function g. We should emphasize that the market where goods are exchanged for money in period t meets before the realization of π t . After π t is realized, no trade occurs until the following period. As a result, the general price level in period t will not depend on the realization of liquidity demand in that period.
Monetary Policy
The monetary authority (or "central bank") has two policy variables, both of which are chosen once and for all in the initial period. First, it sets a (gross) growth rate σ for the per-capita money supply, that is,
Monetary injections/withdrawals take place through lump-sum transfers to young agents. Let τ t denote the real value of the transfer given to young agents at time t; a negative value of τ t denotes a tax that must be paid in currency. These transfers take place at the beginning of each period, and hence a state-contingent policy where σ depends on the realization of π t is infeasible. We assume that σR ≥ 1 holds. In a stationary equilibrium, σR will be the market nominal interest rate, and 7 The stochastic relocations in this model play a role similar to that of the portfolio-preference shocks commonly used in the literature on bank runs. Diamond and Dybvig [7] is the classic reference; see also the recent papers by Peck and Shell [14] and Ennis and Keister [8] , and the references therein. However, we should emphasize that a crisis in our model is caused by a high realization of liquidity demand, not a self-fulfilling bank run.
we are therefore ruling out policies that would lead money to have a strictly higher return than investment. The qualitative properties of equilibrium under such a policy would be very similar to the case where σR = 1 holds. Excluding these policies simplifies the presentation without any loss of economic insight.
Second, the central bank sets a (gross) nominal interest rate φ > 1 on discount window loans.
Note that this policy is always feasible in the sense that it requires no real resources regardless of how the price level changes over time. If, in period t, a bank demands a loan of λ t (measured in real terms, per unit of deposits), it goes to the discount window and receives λ t p t dollars, where p t is the general price level in period t. 8 In the following period, the bank must pay back φλ t p t dollars. We assume that the central bank destroys λ t p t of these dollars and uses the remaining (φ − 1) λ t p t to purchase goods. In this way, the stock of currency in circulation continues to obey (1) and the quantity of discount-window lending in period t will not affect the price level in subsequent periods. We assume that agents derive no utility from the revenue earned by the central bank through this lending policy. As will become clear later, if instead the revenue were rebated to agents as a state-contingent, lump-sum payment, our main results would not change. Such rebates complicate the derivations substantially, so we present the simpler case here.
Banks
A young agent deposits her entire income w + τ t in a bank. The bank promises her a return d m (p t /p t+1 ) , the return offered to movers must satisfy
The second constraint is that payments to non-movers cannot exceed the value of the bank's residual portfolio -remaining cash reserves plus matured investment minus the repayment of the discount window loan. This constraint can be written as
Banks maximize a typical depositor's expected utility subject to these two constraints. Each bank will therefore choose the functions d m t and d t to maximize (2) and (3). Let I t = R (p t+1 /p t ) denote the (gross) market nominal interest rate. That is, I t reflects the additional return that investment offers over currency, and hence represents the opportunity cost of holding cash reserves. Substituting in the two constraints and performing some manipulations, the bank's problem can be written as maximizing
The fractions of currency reserves and investment paid out to movers, as well as the amount of discount-window borrowing, are chosen after the realization of π t , while the fraction of currency in the bank's asset portfolio is chosen before the realization of π t . Hence we can solve the problem backward, by first finding the optimal values of α t , δ t , and λ t as functions of γ t and π t . That is, we
subject to the constraints above. We begin the process of solving this problem by showing that, outside of one knife-edge case, the bank may respond to high liquidity demand by either liquidating investment or borrowing from the discount window, but not both.
Proposition 1
If φ < R/r holds, the solution to (5) has δ t = 0 for all values of γ t and π t . If φ > R/r holds, the solution to (5) has λ t = 0 for all values of γ t and π t .
The proof of this proposition is contained in the appendix, but the intuition is straightforward.
Borrowing from the discount window and liquidating investment are both ways of generating additional consumption for movers as a group (at the expense of non-movers). Moreover, both of these methods have a constant marginal cost, in that the amount of consumption taken away from non-movers for each unit of consumption given to movers is independent of the quantity borrowed or liquidated. Therefore, the bank will only use the less costly of the two methods. If the interest rate at the discount window is low, borrowing is less costly and banks will never liquidate investment. If the interest rate at the discount window is high enough, however, liquidation is less costly and the discount window will be inactive. In the latter case, our model reduces to that presented in Smith [17] . There is one borderline case that the proposition does not cover, when φ is exactly equal to R/r. In this case the solution to (5) is not unique, because the bank is indifferent between liquidating investment and borrowing from the discount window. In what follows, we largely ignore this knife-edge case in order to simplify the exposition. We show in Section 4 that setting φ = R/r cannot be part of an optimal policy.
Using Proposition 1, we can break (5) into two cases and solve each one separately. When φ < R/r holds, the solution sets δ t to zero for all values of π t and sets
where we have
and
When demand for liquidity is fairly low (i.e., the relocation shock is below a critical value π * ), the bank is able to give movers and non-movers the same return by paying out only a fraction of its reserves to movers. When the realization of the relocation shock is greater than π * , however, this approach is no longer feasible. In this case, there are so many movers that even if all of the bank's cash reserves are given to them, they will receive a lower return than the (relatively few) non-movers. Following Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] , we label such an event a banking crisis. In a crisis, the bank has an incentive to borrow currency from the discount window so that it can transfer resources from non-movers to movers. However, such borrowing is costly and, as a result, the bank only undertakes it if the number of movers is above a second critical level π * * .
Some intuition for the range of inaction [π * , π * * ] can be gained by thinking about the set of feasible ways for the bank to divide resources between movers (as a group) and non-movers (as a group), given that γ t is already fixed. One action that is always feasible is to give all cash reserves to movers and the return from all investment to non-movers. If instead the bank wants to give fewer total resources to movers and more to non-movers, perhaps because there are very few movers this period, it can do so on a one-for-one basis. That is, for every unit of future consumption (in the form of currency) that is taken away from movers as a group, exactly one unit is given to non-movers as a group. Now suppose that instead the bank wants to give more resources to movers and fewer to non-movers, perhaps because there is a large number of movers. In this case the bank must either liquidate investment or obtain a loan from the discount window, so that for every unit of additional consumption given to movers, non-movers must give up either R/r or φ units. This difference in the rates of transformation is what leads to the range of inaction [π * , π * * ] in the optimal levels of α t and λ t . When there are very few movers, the optimal action is to give almost all of the resources to non-movers and hence we are in the region where the rate of transformation is unity.
As we examine larger and larger realizations of π t , the solution gives more and more of the bank's currency reserves to movers. At π t = π * , the optimal action reaches the kink in the constraint set where all currency reserves are given to movers. This point remains the optimal choice for a range of values of π t ; only when the realization is greater than π * * is it optimal to move to the steeper-sloped part of the boundary. In conjunction with (8) , this reasoning also demonstrates how the interest rate on discount window loans determines the potential severity of banking crises when φ < R/r holds. The more costly it is to borrow, the larger π t must be (and therefore the larger the gap between the returns of movers and non-movers must be) for a bank to be willing to borrow to ease the crisis.
We now proceed to solve for the optimal value of γ t , still assuming that φ < R/r holds. To do so, we substitute the optimal values of α t and λ t into the bank's objective function in (4) so that the only remaining variable to be determined is γ t . The problem can then be written as
Because borrowing is costly, the solution to this problem will be interior as long as 1 < I t < φ holds. The first-order condition is given by
which can be reduced to
This equation implicitly defines (recall that γ t appears in the expressions for π * and π * * above) the solution to the bank's portfolio allocation problem as a function of the variable I t ∈ (1, φ).
Let γ φ (I t ) denote this solution, where the φ subscript indicates that the solution (i) applies in the region of the parameter space where the discount window is active and (ii) depends on the interest rate charged on discount window loans. The next proposition establishes some properties of this solution.
Proposition 2 For any given φ ∈ (1, R/r) and any I t > 0, the bank's problem has a unique solution. The reserve-deposit ratio γ φ in this solution is a continuous function of I t and satisfies:
To see the intuition for this result, suppose that I t ≤ 1 holds. Then the return on currency is at least as high as the return on investment. Since currency offers the additional advantage of being liquid, banks will hold only currency. If I t ≥ φ holds, on the other hand, then borrowing from the discount window costs no more than holding cash reserves. The quantity of borrowing can be chosen after the demand for liquidity is known, and therefore banks will hold no cash reserves.
For intermediate values of I t , banks will hold both types of assets, with the fraction of resources placed in currency being a decreasing function of I t . A formal proof of the proposition is given in the appendix.
We now examine the solution to the bank's problem in the other case, where φ > R/r holds. In this case, we know from Proposition 1 that the discount window is inactive and thus the problem is the same as if there were no discount window, a case studied in Smith [17] . The solution sets
where π * is again given by (7) and we have
When 1 < I t < R/r holds, the optimal choice of γ t is interior and is implicitly defined by
Let γ`(I t ) denote this solution, where the`subscript indicates that this solution applies in the region of parameter space where liquidation takes places (and the discount window is inactive).
The following is a combination of our Proposition 1 with Proposition 3 in Smith [17] .
Proposition 3 Given any φ > R/r and any I t > 0, the bank's problem has a unique solution. The reserve-deposit ratio γ`in this solution is a continuous function of I t and satisfies
, and (c) γ
Having solved the optimization problem of the bank, we turn to an analysis of general equilibrium.
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the market where money is exchanged for goods must clear at the beginning of each period. Because young agents deposit all of their income in banks, the demand for real money 13 balances comes entirely from banks and market clearing requires that we have
The government's budget constraint can be written as
Define z t ≡ M t /p t to be the (per-capita) level of real balances in the economy. Then, as long as the price level is finite, we have
and hence the market nominal interest rate is given by
We can then rewrite (11) as
where the function γ i is given by either γ φ or γ`, depending on the rate of interest charged at the discount window. When φ > R/r holds, γ i is equal to γ`and this dynamical system is the same as that in the case where there is no discount window, as studied in Smith [17] . When φ < R/r holds, however, γ i is instead given by γ φ and the dynamical system is different.
As (12) shows, the behavior of real money balances is governed by a deterministic difference equation. Because markets meet before the realization of the liquidity shock, ex post liquidity demand cannot affect the current-period price level. Similarly, discount window lending does not affect the supply of currency in the market because the discount window only opens after markets have closed. In addition, currency borrowed from the discount window is removed when these loans are repaid at the beginning of the following period, and hence has no effect on future price levels. For these reasons, the price level and the level of real money balances both follow a deterministic path. It is important to keep in mind, however, that equilibrium consumption is potentially stochastic. Depending on banks' levels of cash reserves and the discount window policy, the returns received by depositors may depend on the realization of π t .
Following Smith [17] , we focus on stationary equilibria, where z t+1 = z t = z holds for all t. In such equilibria, the nominal interest rate is given by I t = σR and the level of real balances by
This expression demonstrates that a stationary equilibrium with valued fiat currency exists if and only if γ i (σR) > 0 holds. In other words, the central bank must set its two policies in such a way that banks demand a positive amount of reserves. Using Propositions 2 and 3, a necessary and sufficient condition for this to be the case is that
hold. If (14) did not hold, either borrowing from the discount window or liquidating investment would be a strictly better source of liquidity than holding cash reserves. The demand for cash reserves would then be zero and money would have no value. In addition, (13) demonstrates that,
when (14) holds, there is a unique positive level of real money balances consistent with stationary equilibrium. Again referring back to Propositions 2 and 3, we see that the stationary monetary equilibrium allocation will therefore be unique, except in the knife-edge case where φ = R/r holds and the bank is indifferent between borrowing from the discount window and liquidating investment. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If (14) holds, there exists a unique positive stationary equilibrium level of real money balances. In addition, as long as φ 6 = R/r holds, there is a unique stationary monetary equilibrium allocation.
In other words, discount window lending does not lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium in this environment if the loans carry a "penalty" rate of interest. 9 This result contrasts strongly with that reported in Smith [17] for the case where φ = 1 holds. In that case, borrowing from the discount window is costless and banks will therefore be unwilling to hold any cash reserves unless there is no opportunity cost of doing so, that is, unless I t = 1 holds. Having I t = 1, in turn, implies that banks are completely indifferent between holding reserves and borrowing from the discount window, and this indeterminacy in the solution to the bank's problem translates into an indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium prices and allocations. When φ > I t holds, however, borrowing from the discount window is more costly than holding cash reserves. We have shown that 9 Interestingly, this type of policy was advocated by Bagehot [2] , who stated that in times of crisis the monetary authority should act as a lender of last resort and lend freely to the banking system, but "at a penalty rate." Martin [13] argues that Bagehot's prescription applies in a commodity money regime where total reserves are scarce, but not in a fiat money regime where currency can be freely printed. Our results show how a penalty-rate policy can indeed be useful in a fiat money system. this implies a unique level of demand for cash reserves, which in turn generates a unique stationary monetary equilibrium. Banking crises may or may not occur in this equilibrium, depending on the exact policies followed by the central bank. We investigate the properties of this equilibrium, as well as the optimal policy question, in the next section.
Banking Crises and Welfare
We now examine the welfare properties of the equilibrium described above. Of particular interest is how central bank policy affects the frequency of banking crises in equilibrium, the severity of these crises, and the level of real investment. We continue to focus entirely on stationary monetary equilibria, and hence maintain the assumption that (14) holds. Recall that a banking crisis occurs whenever movers and non-movers receive different returns on their deposits. We begin by establishing that, for all but one choice of monetary policy, banking crises will occur in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If σR = 1 holds, banking crises never occur in equilibrium. If σR > 1 holds, however, banking crises occur with positive probability in each period.
This result follows directly from Propositions 2 and 3, using the fact that I t = σR holds in a stationary equilibrium. With I t = 1, banks will set γ t to unity and therefore will have sufficient cash reserves to meet any level of liquidity demand. With I t > 1, on the other hand, banks will set γ t less than unity, and therefore with positive probability the realized value of π t will be greater than π * . Because φ > 1 holds, it follows from (7) and (8) that such a value of π t will necessarily lead to a crisis.
The severity of a crisis depends on the realized value of π t and on the interest rate at the discount window. From Proposition 1 we know that setting φ below R/r guarantees that (costly) liquidation of investment will never take place. Within this range, φ also determines how distorted the real allocation of resources can become. Using (6) we can calculate the largest possible difference between the returns given to movers and to non-movers, which is a measure of the maximum potential severity of a crisis. For values of π t greater than π * * , we have
The difference between these two expressions is strictly increasing in φ. In other words, a lower interest rate on discount window loans implies a better "worst case scenario" in terms of the distortion of real allocations. This happens because a lower interest rate makes banks more willing to borrow currency and thereby transfer resources from non-movers to movers during a crisis.
We now turn to the optimal policy question: How should a benevolent central bank set the policy pair (σ, φ)? Following Smith [17] , we take the objective to be the steady-state utility of a young agent. 10 We begin by discussing the "first-best" allocation in this environment. Consider the problem of a social planner who directly controls investment and allocation decisions in both locations and who therefore is essentially unaffected by the relocation friction. It should be clear that this planner has no use for money and hence will place the total endowment in each period into storage. When the stored goods mature, the planner will divide the proceeds equally among the (now-old) agents in each location, regardless of their place of birth. The utility level of a young agent in this allocation is given by ln (Rw). No policy implements this allocation in the decentralized economy with relocation and information frictions. However, as we now show, there are policies that implement arbitrarily nearby allocations without introducing indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 6
For any ε > 0, there exists a policy (σ, φ) such that steady-state welfare in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium generated by (σ, φ) is within ε of the first-best value ln (Rw).
Getting very close to the first-best allocation requires having nearly all of the economy's total endowment placed into storage (and very little held as cash reserves). A bank will only be willing to hold very little currency if borrowing from the discount window is relatively inexpensive, that is, if φ is very close to unity. In order for a stationary monetary equilibrium to exist and be unique, we need 1 < σR < φ to hold, and hence for σR to be very close to unity as well. In the proof in the appendix, we show that a sequence of policies ¡ σ j , φ j ¢ can be constructed so that, along this sequence, the allocation in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium converges uniformly to the first-best allocation described above. Note that the first-best allocation itself cannot be implemented. Achieving the first-best allocation requires that all of the economy's resources be placed into storage, which implies that there must be zero demand for cash reserves and hence money cannot have value. When money has no value, discount window lending is clearly ineffective. What Proposition 6 shows is that a "good" policy in this environment is to make the demand for cash reserves very small, and to use the discount window to provide nearlycostless liquidity. We should emphasize that this result is not driven by our assumption that agents derive no utility from the revenue made by the central bank on discount-window loans. Because a low-interest-rate policy can bring the economy very close to the first-best allocation, it is better than a high-interest-rate policy regardless of how this revenue is used.
These results point to an important distinction between money and liquidity. Money is an asset that is inherently liquid, but a demand for liquidity does not necessarily imply a demand for money.
In the environment presented above, there would be no demand for money if liquidity were freely provided by the central bank. Indeed, the benefit of having a discount window in this environment derives precisely from the fact that it helps meet the liquidity needs of relocated agents in a way that does not prevent socially-productive investments from being undertaken. 11 The lack of another, more fundamental role for money limits the model's ability to address policy issues, as evidenced by the non-existence of an optimal policy discussed above. In the next section, we change the investment technology so that money can be useful as a store of value. We show that, in this case, a well-defined optimal policy does exist, and that this policy is the limit of the policies described in Proposition 6.
Diminishing Returns and the Friedman Rule
We now show that the non-existence of an optimal policy illustrated in the previous section results from the lack of a role for money in the model other than providing liquidity to relocated agents. We do so by changing the technology so that there are decreasing returns to investment, which allows money to be useful as a store of value. In particular, we replace the storage technology with a production technology that uses capital and labor as inputs. We show that there is then a well-defined optimal policy that implements the first-best (stationary) allocation as the unique stationary monetary equilibrium. This optimal policy can be viewed as an implementation of the Friedman rule. We should emphasize that the particular way in which we modify the model is not important for our message. Any method of introducing diminishing returns to investment that are "strong enough" will deliver the same result; instead of production, for example, one could introduce intra-generational consumption loans, as in Champ, Smith, and Williamson [5] and Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [1] . We have chosen to add production to the model because it entails making minimal modifications to the basic structure, and because it places the model within the well-known Diamond [6] framework.
11 In this way, our Proposition 6 is closely related to Proposition 5 in Haslag and Martin [12] . They study a model where the fraction of agents relocated is the same in every period, and show how discount window lending can allow banks to hold fewer reserves and make more productive investment. Our results are also related to those of Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Russell [3] on the optimality of the Friedman rule. They study a similar model, but with no discount window. They show that, as in Smith [17] , a money growth rate rule that leads to a zero nominal interest rate is not optimal because it generates too little real investment. They then construct a "simulator regime" policy under which money is valued but holding money does not preclude real investment. Under this regime a zero nominal interest rate is optimal.
The changes to the model are as follows. At the very beginning of each period, perfectly competitive firms use capital and labor to produce output using a constant-returns-to-scale technology
where k t is total capital input and n t is total labor input. The function F satisfies the usual concavity and Inada conditions. For simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates completely in production.
Agents are no longer endowed with goods; instead, each young agent is endowed with one unit of time. This time is supplied inelastically as labor, so that the pre-transfer income of a young agent is equal to the real wage, denoted by w t . In place of the storage technology used above, one unit of consumption placed into investment at time t now yields one unit of capital at time t + 1. After production takes place, the timing of events within a period is the same as that described in Section 2. In particular, investment decisions must be made before the size of the relocation shock π t is known. Investment can be liquidated after π t has been realized, in which case it yields r < 1 units of consumption. In all other ways, the model is the same as before. Young agents find it optimal to deposit all of their income in a bank, and the bank places a fraction γ t of its portfolio in currency and the remaining (1 − γ t ) in investment. The bank's problem is unchanged. The only critical difference that adding production brings to the model is that the return on investment now varies with the aggregate level of investment.
Since the size of the population (and hence of the labor force) is normalized to unity, the equilibrium factor-pricing relationships can be written as
is the intensive production function and R t denotes the rental price of capital in period t. Note that the real return on goods invested in period t is given by R t+1 .
Our goal is to compare the policy prescriptions of this model with those derived for the linearstorage model in Section 4. For this reason we only consider stationary allocations, which are easily compared with allocations in the earlier model. We begin by finding the optimal stationary allocation, and then we ask if there exists a policy choice under which it is the unique stationary monetary equilibrium allocation. The first exercise is as before: we examine the problem of a social planner whose objective is to maximize the steady-state utility level of a young agent. We allow the planner to choose the initial level of the capital stock, imposing the constraint that the level of capital be the same for all periods. 12 Letting k * denote the optimal stationary quantity of capital, the planner will set
In other words, k * will be set according to the golden rule, because this plan maximizes the total amount of consumption available to the planner in each period. The planner will distribute this consumption exactly as in the earlier model: in each location, the total amount of consumption available will be divided evenly among the old agents, regardless of their place of birth. The level of consumption given to each agent will be equal to f (k * ) − k * . Using (15) and (16), we can then write the utility level of an agent in this allocation as ln (w (k * )) . Notice the similarity between this expression and that given in Section 4 for the optimal utility level in the linear-storage model.
An agent's consumption is independent of her relocation status and of π t , and is equal to the value of her young-period endowment multiplied by the rate of return on investment (R in the linear storage model, unity in the optimal stationary allocation here).
We now ask under what conditions this optimal allocation can be implemented as an equilibrium by the proper choice of policy. The analysis in the previous sections demonstrates that such a policy must have φ = 1. Only if borrowing at the discount window is costless will banks offer perfect insurance against relocation. Setting φ = 1 requires setting σ so that σR t = 1 holds, and hence our candidate policy is (σ, φ) = (1, 1) . Under this policy, the solution to the bank's problem is slightly different than that described in Section 2. The values of α t and λ t given in (6) are still an optimal choice. 13 However, the solution to the portfolio-choice problem (9) is degenerate. All agents will now receive the average return on the bank's portfolio regardless of the realization of π t , and therefore γ t will be chosen to maximize this return. If the optimal stationary allocation is implemented, then the return on both money and investment will be unity and a bank will be completely indifferent between any two levels of γ t in [0, 1]. The equilibrium conditions under the candidate optimal policy are therefore (i) a no-arbitrage condition stating that money and investment yield the same return 12 We should stress that this emphasis on stationarity is only to facilitate the comparison of allocations in this model with those in the linear-storage model. If the initial level of capital were fixed arbitrarily, we would be dealing with allocations that involve growth (or decay) toward a steady state. The results we present below would still hold in such a setting, but their relationship to the results in Section 4 would be less evident.
and (ii) a materials-balance condition stating that all savings takes place either in money or in investment
Because σ = 1 holds, the definition of z t leads to the relationship
and therefore the equilibrium laws of motion are given by
If there is a stationary equilibrium in which money has value, these two expressions imply that the equilibrium level of capital must equal the optimal stationary level k * . The equilibrium level of real money balances would then be given by
The answer to our question of whether or not the candidate policy implements the optimal stationary allocation depends crucially on the sign of z * . If z * is negative, then a stationary monetary equilibrium does not exist under the candidate policy. In this case, total saving when wages are equal to w (k * ) is insufficient to maintain the capital stock at k * . As a result, the equilibrium capital stock would need to be smaller than k * , and the return on investment would be greater than unity. This is analogous to the condition R > 1 in the linear-storage model, and implies that money cannot have value under the policy (σ, φ) = (1, 1). As in Section 4, the optimal stationary allocation cannot be implemented because there is no role for money in the model outside of the provision of liquidity. The optimal allocation requires that no money be held, but then liquidity cannot be provided through a discount window.
If z * is positive, however, (k * , z * ) does represent a stationary monetary equilibrium, and it is straightforward to see that this is the only such equilibrium. Both money and capital offer a return of unity in this equilibrium, and therefore all agents have a consumption level of w (k * ). In other words, in this case the policy (σ, φ) = (1, 1) implements the optimal stationary allocation as the unique stationary monetary equilibrium. We state this result as our final proposition.
Proposition 7
Define z * as in (17) . If z * > 0 holds, then the allocation in the unique stationary monetary equilibrium under the policy (σ, φ) = (1, 1) is equal to the optimal stationary allocation.
This result verifies that the non-existence of an optimal policy in Section 4 was caused by the linearity of the investment technology and the lack of a role for money in the model other than to provide liquidity for relocated agents. If there is a role for money as a store of value, as in the Diamond-type model presented above, then costless liquidity can be provided at the discount window without undermining the demand for cash reserves, and an optimal policy does exist.
This optimal policy can be viewed as an implementation of the Friedman rule, where currency and investment offer the same return and banks are given access to costless liquidity through the discount window. This policy does not lead to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium because only one level of real investment (k * ) will lead to the rate of return required for banks to be willing to hold both assets.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented an environment in which discount window lending is a useful policy tool for attenuating the effects of banking crises caused by a shortage of liquidity. The previous literature has focused on lending at a zero nominal interest rate, and has shown how such lending can prevent real allocations from becoming distorted during periods of high liquidity demand. However, two negative effects of such costless liquidity provision have also been identified: it can lead to inefficiently low levels of investment and to indeterminacy of stationary equilibrium. We have shown how charging a penalty rate on discount window loans leads to a unique stationary equilibrium in which money has value. In other words, much of the benefit of having an elastic currency can be obtained without generating indeterminacy, provided that the discount window lends at abovemarket rates. Such penalty-rate policies lead to the occurrence of banking crises in equilibrium and to inefficiently low levels of investment. However, by setting a small enough penalty the central bank can make the probability of a crisis occurring in each period arbitrarily small and can bring investment arbitrarily close to the first-best level. In addition, our analysis has highlighted an important distinction between money and liquidity. In an environment with limited communication and stochastic relocation, agents demand liquidity but there is no demand for money per se. This fact restricts the central bank to choose a policy that induces a demand for money, such as charging a penalty rate on discount window loans. As a result, the central bank cannot implement the optimal allocation in this environment. When money plays another, more fundamental role in the economy, such as acting as a store of value, this restriction is removed and the central bank can freely provide liquidity without undermining the demand for cash reserves. In this case, a combination of the Friedman rule and a costless-liquidity regime at the discount window does implement the optimal policy.
The specific policy prescriptions of our analysis obviously depend on the specific features of the environment that we consider. In particular, the only uncertainty in our model is about liquidity demand. There is no uncertainty about the real value of a bank's assets or a bank's ability to repay a discount window loan. It would be interesting to know how the optimal lending policy would change in the presence of solvency shocks 14 and, in particular, whether or not such shocks would make a strictly positive penalty rate optimal. If so, the optimal money-growth rate might differ from the Friedman rule. Another important friction that is absent from our framework is asymmetric information. It is often pointed out that the presence of a lender of last resort can generate moral hazard, resulting in excessive risk taking by banks and therefore greater uncertainty about a bank's ability to repay the loan. 15 Again, it would be interesting to see if such a change in the environment would lead to an optimal policy that involves charging a strictly positive penalty rate on discount window loans and, if so, how this would in turn affect the optimal monetary policy. We leave these questions for future research.
14 In a different environment, Freeman [10] studies this problem and finds that a zero-nominal-rate lending policy should be combined with quantity restrictions at the discount window. See also Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister [1] on the role of quantity restrictions.
Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The derivatives of the objective function (5) with respect to the three choice variables are ∂ ∂α t : π t γ t α t γ t + δ t (1 − γ t ) I t r R + λ t − (1 − π t ) γ t (1 − α t ) γ t + (1 − δ t ) (1 − γ t ) I t − λ t φ (18) ∂ ∂δ t : π t (1 − γ t ) I t r R α t γ t + δ t (1 − γ t ) I t r R + λ t − (1 − π t ) (1 − γ t ) I t (1 − α t ) γ t + (1 − δ t ) (1 − γ t ) I t − λ t φ (19)
Suppose that φ < R/r holds. For the solution to have δ t > 0, we need (19) to be non-negative.
However, this would imply that both (18) and (20) are strictly positive, and therefore that the solution must have α t and λ t at their maximum possible values. In other words, it must be the case that no resources are kept for non-movers, so that d t = 0 holds. Given this, it is straightforward to show that d m t is strictly decreasing in δ t (because an increase in liquidation implies a corresponding decrease in discount window borrowing, and liquidation is more costly). Therefore, the solution cannot have δ t > 0. Now suppose that φ > R/r holds. For the solution to have λ t > 0, we need (20) to be nonnegative. This would imply that both (18) and (19) are strictly positive, and therefore that the solution must have α t = 1 and δ t = 1. However, the bank would then have no resources left at time t + 1 with which to repay the loan, and therefore the upper bound on λ t would be zero. Hence the solution cannot have λ t > 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let M (γ t , I t ) denote the objective function in (9) . Because this function is strictly concave and the constraint set is compact, we know that there is a unique solution to the bank's problem for any I t > 0. The first derivative of the objective can we written as
Using L'Hôpital's rule, one can show
M 1 (γ t , I t ) = 1 − I t .
